Top 3 posts

Here are the top 3 posts since we began on August 7 2018, in order.

1.  Hidden in plain view Could the unexplained change in ‘other valuation differences’ reported by Just Group between 2016 and 2017 be possibly explained by the fact they changed their deferment rate assumption to comply with new PRA requirements? They aren’t telling us.

2. Asleep at the Institute Roughly, “the Institute has just published a paper that (a) shows complete ignorance of developments in financial economics and (b) is almost certainly the product of entrenched commercial interests.”

3. Mulheirn vs Harding The much vaunted shortage of homes is a myth. “The theory and the data clearly indicate that a shortage of homes has not contributed to the 150 per cent rise in UK real prices over the past two decades. ”

On the last one, one common explanation of the house price rise, popular both with the general public and with actuaries, is ‘supply and demand’.

A moment’s reflection suggests this is silly. First, it’s not the supply or demand that changes the price, it is expectations about supply or demand. There might be no issue with current supply at all, but if the available information suggests a shortage of supply in a few years’ time, that will be reflected in the price now.

Second, expectations about supply and demand would not explain a prolonged change in price. Assuming nothing else changes, the expectations would be immediately reflected in the price.

Objectors will object that this assumes market efficiency, i.e. the tendency for market prices to reflect available information, and perhaps they have a point, but enough for now.

 

Fascinating but toxic

Geeks only. The chart above shows why Equity Release Mortgages are both fascinating and toxic. We have discussed ERM valuation in a number of earlier posts, but ERMs are used as assets to back conventional annuity books under what’s called ‘matching adjustment’, but we need to consider both sides of the balance sheet, because the insurance industry has weird ways of valuing liabilities too.

The PRA (and IFRS) allows firms to discount insurance liabilities at the estimated rate of return on the assets, which is absolutely bonkers but the industry lobbied hard in 2012 for it and here we are. Thus there is a ‘matching adjustment benefit’ arising from the higher discount rate, which effectively creates equity on the books of an MA firm.

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Past and present tense

Our postbag is bursting its seams with comments, largely critical, about how we have misunderstood the ‘two balance sheet’ approach used by Just group. We have claimed that Just were (past tense) using an implied deferment rate of minus 2.75% for both their IFRS and Solvency II balance sheet. Our critics say that, while the firm are using that rate for the IFRS balance sheet, they are (present tense) using a rate of 0.5% for Solvency II purposes. See their 2017 Solvency report, p.54.

We are wrong, and must apologise immediately!

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Weird distributions #1

Turn to any textbook treatment of the Black-Scholes model, and you will find a list of things that the model ‘assumes’. Wikipedia is no exception. These divide into assumptions about the market, such as no arbitrage, ability to short sell etc., which I shall set aside for now, and assumptions about the asset process. Foremost among these are that

  • Future returns are independent of past values, i.e. the process is random
  • Log returns are Gaussian, or normally distributed
  • Volatility is constant
  • Drift is constant

Now it is true that if these conditions are satisfied, then the model will work (I shall discuss an appropriate sense of ‘work’ below). That is, these are sufficient conditions (p implies q). But it is also commonly assumed1 that if they are not satisfied, then the model will not work (not p implies not q), i.e. it is assumed that the conditions are necessary, as well as sufficient.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

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Why I ignore the crash

 

Markets iffy last week but my shoulders shrug. I have a fixed price target for my portfolio, so what with all the market collapse my growth projection has increased. Moreover I discount all my future liabilities (paying gas bills, Sainsbury’s, ‘biting on granite’ worktops, garden shed, phone, new pair of trousers etc) by the same growth rate so my overall position is unchanged.

We should all do this.  After all, that’s what the Bank of England recommends.1

Artificial stupidity

When someone mentions ‘Artificial Intelligence’ I usually ignore them completely. But the subject comes up so frequently that it is impossible to ignore. Andy Haldane fretted a few weeks ago that AI might cause ‘widespread unemployment, despite an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development report earlier this year saying that fears of mass unemployment for automation were ‘overblown’ as most jobs were harder to automate than previous studies had suggested.

One of the better articles came out yesterday (9 October) quoting Roger Schank who predicts a new AI winter, ‘a reference to the period in the early 1980s when disappointment over the progress of the technology led to a retreat from the field’.

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A for Anonymous

We received an email from Anonymous@hotmail.com (which doesn’t exist, of course) suggesting we look at slide 4 on page 2 of this presentation given at the Life Conference in November 2017. The presentation was given by Tom Kenny (of Just Group), and Gina Craske of KPMG (auditor of Just Group). The other members of the Party including a representative from each of the other three big accountancy firms, two members representing ERM providers, and only one academic that I could make out.

Many thanks, Anonymous, but we already knew this. See also this response to CP 13/18 by the Institute which identifies the other two Institutional bodies involved in replying to the PRA, namely the Life Standards and Consultations sub Committee, whose members are listed here, and the Life Insurance Board, whose members are listed here.

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