UK sets out plans for failing insurers

The HM Treasury Consultation document is here,  setting out the government’s proposal to introduce a dedicated insurer resolution regime in the UK.

It would be so tempting to reply asking why such a regime would be necessary, given that insurer capital is determined by Solvency II to a 1 in 200 year event of insolvency, and that all insurers have a capital buffer well in excess of the required amount, making insolvency something like a 1 in 10,000 year event. The government doesn’t plan for asteroids hitting Westminster, why plan for insurers going bust? Could never happen.

(Irony)

When less equals more (capital)

Source: WTW, Analysis of Proposed Solvency II Reforms, 21 July 2022

The Association of British Insurers came out yesterday with a firm statement on the proposals to increase the capital that insurers ‘hold’, arguing, based on analysis by Willis Towers Watson that the proposals would in fact on average lower the capital ‘held’.

This results conflicts somewhat with UK government claims that the proposals would free up capital to support investment in wind farms and other worthy things.

Figure 4.1 from Willis is copied above. It had Eumaeus scratching his head for a long while, even with help from his dogs. The block colour represents the range in which ‘all’ the sample of 16 firms sit, except for the maximum and minimum outlier values, so the block colour does not in fact represent ‘all’ firms, but never mind.

But the results are intriguing. Under the PRA scenario A, for example, the average reduction in  own funds (Solvency II ‘capital’) leads to an average reduction in capital of about 5%. But that is for all firms. For all annuity providers – who are the main customers for MA – the average reduction is 20%. And worse, there is an outlier firm that loses 30% of its capital. Yikes!

Admittedly, scenario A is severe, and the PRA always signalled this, but none of the other scenarios look particularly encouraging given the purpose of the government proposals. For the proposals were to free up capital for long term infrastructure projects, which could only come from firms with long term liabilities, i.e. annuity providers. But it is annuity providers who are most severely affected under all the scenarios!

It’s all a mess and will lead to more friction between the government and the Bank of England.

That is not to say the reforms are a bad thing. Far from it: in Eumaeus’ view they do not go nearly far enough. But the mess is an indication of the broken nature of life insurance, and of the failure of regulation to deal with the problems in a timely way in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis.

Those who sow the wind etc etc.

[UPDATE] The Eumaeus response to HMT is here.

Sam’s Basel Bufferati

Sam Woods’ latest speech “Bufferati” given at City Week on April 26th is a real corker – and its full of dreadful jokes too.

As his colleagues were finishing of their magnus opus Basel III – a hideous monstrosity that should have been killed at birth – Sam wonders out loud about an alternative, which he calls the Bufferati model. Think of capital standards as car models, he suggests. He continues

But I have found myself thinking it might be a good idea to introduce, on the next door assembly line as it were, a new concept car version of the capital stack – radically simpler, radically usable, and a million miles away from the current debate but which might prove instructive over the longer term.

It is refreshing to see a regulator of Sam’s seniority thinking in first principles’ terms. He goes on to say

Design features

While the capital regime is fiendishly complex, its underlying economic goals are fairly simple: ensure that the banking sector has enough capital to absorb losses, preserve financial stability and support the economy through stresses. In developing the Bufferati, my guiding principle has been: any element of the framework that isn’t actually necessary to achieve those underlying goals should be removed. The Bufferati is as simple as possible, but no simpler.

With that mind, my simple framework revolves around a single, releasable buffer of common equity, sitting above a low minimum requirement. This would be radically different from the current regime: no Pillar 2 buffers; no CCoBs, CCyBs, O-SII buffer and G-SiB buffers; no more AT1. [His emphasis]

A little later he adds

“At the core of this concept is a single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks and replacing the entirety of the current set of buffers. [Our emphasis]

And a nice summary

So in summary, the Bufferati has:

  1. A single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks.

  2. A low minimum capital requirement, to maximise the size of the buffer.

  3. A ‘ladder of intervention’ based on judgement for firms who enter their buffer – no mechanical triggers and thresholds.

  4. The entire buffer potentially releasable in a stress.

  5. All requirements met with common equity.

  6. A mix of risk-weighted and leverage-based requirements.

  7. Stress testing at the centre of how we set capital levels.

There is some good stuff in there, but it’s still a bit of a dog’s dinner, leaving a lot of scope for regulatory discretion, gaming of metrics and most worrying of all, the adjective ‘low’ as in ‘low capital requirements’ is a massive red flag.

But in the spirit of Sam’s bufferati/buggerati/whatever model, we would like to suggest some slight improvements as follows, in bold:

So in summary, our improved Bufferati has:

  1. A single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks.

  2. A high minimum capital requirement, with the minimum ratio of capital to leverage exposure or total assets set at (at least) 15%.

  3. No ‘ladder of intervention’; only mechanical triggers and thresholds.

  4. All requirements met with market value common equity.

  5. Only leverage-based requirements.

  6. No stress testing.

So just a couple of tweaks there, Sam, and you’re fine.

Could cladding scandal trigger new bank crisis?

Blimey,  reports the Daily Mail.

The building safety scandal could lead to the next banking crisis if leaseholders are forced to pay for repairs, MPs were warned yesterday.  Former Bank of England economist Dean Buckner said widespread mortgage defaults could spark a Northern Rock-style run on the banks. His dire warning came after campaigners told the Commons Housing Select Committee that ministers needed to ask them for a spreadsheet of building safety data because they ‘had no handle’ on the scandal themselves.

The Housecom hearing is on Parliament TV here

Are UK banks really as strong as the Bank says?

Youtube this morning.

With the economy undergoing the biggest downturn since 1709, it is natural to ask if UK banks are strong enough to withstand this downturn and still function normally. The mood music coming from the Bank of England has certainly been reassuring. But are UK banks really as strong as the Bank says?

The answer, sadly, is no. In this video, Professor Syed Kamall (IEA Academic and Research Director) chairs a discussion with Dr Dean Buckner and Professor Kevin Dowd, who authored a recent IEA Discussion Paper “How Strong are British Banks: and can they pass the Covid Stress Test”.

Professor Dowd and Dr Buckner argue that Banks are more fragile now than they were going into the last crisis. The Bank of England’s failure to ensure the resilience of the banking system suggests a need for radical reform that does away with the regulator.

Lenders more fragile than before crash

The Times mentions today a report by the Institute of Economic Affairs dismissing claims that banks are strong enough to survive a more severe financial crisis than the last one.

Kevin Dowd and Dean Buckner, the authors, say that acute pressure on banking stock prices “contradicts” the central bank’s conclusions that they are adequately capitalised. “The Bank of England’s claims that UK banks are so strongly capitalised after the global financial crisis they could go through an even worse event and still emerge in good shape do not hold water.”

Oh dear.

The report is here.

Can UK Banks Pass the COVID-19 Stress Test, Updated

Dean and I have updated our banking report, and the new version is available here.

The new version gives figures updated to May 29th and is a little trimmed down. Its main highlight is a new Figure 1 which gives UK banks’ share prices since the start of 2007

UK Bank Share Prices Since the Beginning of 2007

and is based on Howard Mustoe’s lovely share price chart in his BBC report “Are Britain’s banks strong enough for coronavirus?

The exam question is: Explain how this Figure shows that UK banks are well capitalised.

Answers to Sam W, c/o Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London EC2R 8AH.

Definitely a cushion

More to follow but  see below for a partial transcript of the Treasury Committee hearing yesterday, with Harriett Baldwin quizzing Jon Cunliffe and others about the effect of Covid on life insurers.

Does Sir Jon agree with Sir John Vickers “when he says that, er, the Matching Adjustment is more of a  mask than a cushion“?

A lot of waffle from Sir Jon. He says that ‘market liquidity risks’ are not suffered if assets are held to maturity, which is correct, then says “if you were to price the assets that insurance companies hold on their balance sheets at market prices, you would be picking up how liquid the assets were, whether you could sell them in stress etc”,  which is clearly false, but at least confirms that he thinks it is a cushion.

Baldwin complains that she is out of time, and Stride (Chair) closes with the remark that he senses “a slight frustration there, and you might have valued a little more time to probe”

I think on that basis we might write to the panel after this session, and if we do if I can ask the members of the panel to respond very promptly to any letter we might send on the issue of insurance and stress testing.

Clearly more to follow. Stay tuned.

Continue reading “Definitely a cushion”

Are Britain’s banks strong enough for coronavirus?

Howard Mustoe’s article on banking strength is here.  Quite long, but worth it (of course!).  It quotes Durham University Professor Kevin Dowd and former Bank of England regulator Dean Buckner saying the most appropriate capital measure is a market value one, which is based on banks’ share prices.

This is calculated by multiplying the number of shares in issue by the current share price. They prefer this measure because share prices are an up-to-date reflection of what investors think a company is worth, whereas the banks’ reported figures are not.

True, although other miserable people say to focus on book value.

Continue reading “Are Britain’s banks strong enough for coronavirus?”