The Harry I Knew

Roger J. Brown

[This guest posting from Dr. Roger Brown from his latest MathEstate newsletter gives a uniquely personal obituary to the late, great Harry Markowitz, the inventor of modern portfolio theory. Harry died in San Diego on 22 June 2023 at the age of 95. May he rest in peace.]

Lost one of my heroes

In the final year of the last Century, my last year of Graduate School, the San Diego Union Tribune did an article on Harry Markowitz. Thus, I learned he and I lived in the same city. Of course, I called him up to propose a lunch. Lucky for me he said “Yes.” It was before cellphone cameras. To that first lunch I brought a small “point-and-shoot” camera which I asked his assistant to use.

Unfortunately, I did not notice it was set on “Panoramic” which provided a very wide view of many things except, ironically, the heads of the subjects. Harry was 6’4”. For years a picture hung in my office of two hands shaking in front of Harry Markowitz’s belt buckle. Thus began a great friendship.

He towered over me in all respects. He embodied the best of what it meant to be an academic. To those who value rational thinking he was a National Treasure. Every bit equal to his academic accomplishments was his humanity. At that first lunch he described his penchant for putting 25-year-old balsamic vinegar on ice cream. He liked to cook. We exchanged recipes for more than two decades.

His sense of humor was grand. We had heard many of the same jokes but delighted in telling variants of them over again to each other. When, rarely, I had one he had not heard he relished it, doubling over in laughter. It occurred to me that if my greatest accomplishment in academia was making Harry laugh, that would be enough.

Rational in all areas, his health was no exception. For years I would set aside an entire afternoon for our regular lunch, knowing it would be preceded and followed by a long walk. During those walks we discussed all manner of things, academics, mathematics, art and theater, family and, of course, economics.

He shared my bemused interest in politics, wondering right alongside me and everyone else where those whacky ideas came from and who really believed they would work.

His own pure rationality was tempered and tested by his devotion to his wife, Barbara. I was glad to have had the chance to tell him what I admired most in him was his care for her. When the COVID pandrossy ruined plans for their 50th wedding anniversary, I know it was a big disappointment.

He was always writing. He thought he had something to say, and he was right. His view of the world influenced finance; his view of life influenced me. I was so lucky. I heard some of the best things Harry had to say directly from him.

Naturally, we both slowed over the years. I once told him I had made it to the age he was when we first met. He was not impressed. After he turned 90, he was fond of saying that it was too late for him to “die tragically.” The walks got shorter but if the spring in his step lagged, his mind never did. He was always in search of a puzzle, a pun or a way to see life like no one else.

We all should emulate my friend whom I often referred to, in his presence and with a hint of foolishness, as “The Great Man.” The truth is Harry enjoyed being Harry. We are all the richer for it.

Harry’s incredible mind gave us Modern Portfolio Theory. More importantly, his wonderful heart gave rationality a good name.

 

Ups and downs

The chart above simulates the price history of a 2% coupon 30 year gilt purchased at the beginning of January 2017 and held until  now (18 October). As you clearly see, the price rose throughout 2019, 2020 and most of 2021, then abruptly collapses, with the decline accelerating towards the third quarter of 2022. As journalists live to say “gilt prices fall as yields rise”. Quite.

No comment for now. I will discuss the odd but significant blip in March 2020 in the next post.

What are the losses from LDI?

 

The coverage of the Liability Driven Investments affair has been highly polarized. On the one hand, there are those (mostly consultants) suggesting it is a storm in a tea cup, LDI working ‘as expected’, nothing to see here, move on.

On the other hand, actuaries like Richard Lund, speaking  at the First Actuarial Conference about severely disrupted core gilt market functioning, excessive and sudden tightening of financing conditions for the real economy etc etc.

Someone should at least be answering questions. E.g. if there have been losses, how much are they?  See the chart above. A long-dated bond (here 18 years) could easily have halved in value with a move in rates from 2% to 5%. Any scheme that sold at those levels will have incurred a massive loss, or so you would think. Clearers like Northern Trust reported being overwhelmed by a slew of margin calls during bond market turmoil, so we know that selling happened.

So who was selling? And how much was lost? “We should be told”.

il ritorno d’ulisse

 

Apologies again for the absence. Eumaeus (and Ulysses) were far away from their homeland for many weeks, and missed the market hell of the past few weeks. More on that later.

Meanwhile, the chart above shows the total return on 10 year gilts against total return on the FTSE, which I have been following for a long time, and which I last discussed in January 2021 here.

Continue reading “il ritorno d’ulisse”

Speculating on short term volatility

Retriever writes

But isn’t the point that hedge funds tend to have fairly short time horizons, and that bonds close to redemption will be trading close to par – leading to limited scope for making money in the way you suggest? I’d have thought that what you suggest only works if you can hold the bonds for a long time – so it might work for life insurers even if it doesn’t work for hedge funds?

Continue reading “Speculating on short term volatility”

Risk premium update Dec 2020

Source: Eumaeus, Bank of England

The Guardian reports on warnings from “a veteran City guru” that “an epic bubble of Wall Street crash proportions” is likely to burst1.

Jeremy Grantham, the British co-founder of the US investment firm GMO, said in a letter to clients that current investor behaviour bore the hallmarks of the mood in the run-up to the 1929 Wall Street crash.

Continue reading “Risk premium update Dec 2020”

Q3 dividends

PRA meeting, believed to be not later than 79 AD

For FTSE 100 and 250 stocks with dividends to be paid by end of September: 40% down on the level this year, as opposed to 60% down for Q2. So, you know, getting somewhat better.

Corporate bonds generally back to pre-virus levels, with a some troubled exceptions (aviation, tourism).

So perhaps the PRA was right in claiming that volatility is short term, and that what goes down is bound to go back up in time.

No, you know we don’t believe that.

Liquidity vs default risk

The core assumption of Matching Adjustment is that default risk changes very slowly over time, which is why the average spread over a 30 years period is one of the inputs into the Fundamental Spread (=credit risk spread) calculation. It follows that sharp movements in bond spreads cannot be the result of changes in default risk, hence cannot correspond to any change in the credit risk spread. The change must therefore be in the Matching Adjustment (=liquidity) spread.

How could we test this assumption?

Continue reading “Liquidity vs default risk”

More Market Value Nonsense from the Bank

In his opening remarks to the Treasury Committee on May 20th, Governor Bailey made an interesting observation point about market values:

 … had you done a stress test in the run-up the financial crisis on the market value, you would have been doing it on the market values that were trading well in excess of book values, so … that would of course have severely misled you. You would have concluded there was no problem and you would obviously have been badly wrong. (Our emphasis)

Mr. Bailey isn’t the first Bank spokesman to make this claim. The Bank’s head of financial stability Alex Brazier said as much in almost the same words back in January 2017:

… if you had [relied on market cap values] before the crisis, you would have been led completely astray … You would have been led to the conclusion that the British banking system was remarkably resilient, and, as forecasting errors go, that would have been quite a good one. 1

It’s an important point, but it is wrong. Flat out wrong.

It’s a shame that none of the MPs challenged it.

Continue reading “More Market Value Nonsense from the Bank”

Coronavirus to cost insurers more than $200bn

By Oliver Ralph, FT today.

Just over half of the $203bn estimated loss relates to claims, with insurers expecting to pay out for events cancellation, business interruption and trade credit cover. Another $96bn comes from investment losses, where turmoil in financial markets has hit the assets insurers hold to fund claims. “This is a loss of a magnitude that none of us have seen in our lifetime,” said John Neal, Lloyd’s chief executive.

But that is general insurance.

Continue reading “Coronavirus to cost insurers more than $200bn”