Lords lording it

Kevin spotted this discussion at the House of Lords on 5 September. Lord Bates:

My Lords, the Government take the issues raised in this report very seriously. Equity release offers an effective way for home owners to enhance their standard of living in later life, but must not threaten their financial stability or place consumers at risk. The Prudential Regulation Authority is alert to the issue. It is acting to set a clear and more precise prudential expectation for insurance companies’ risk management of equity release mortgages.

Incorrect. The PRA expectations are about the valuation of ERMs not risk management. See our August 23 post. Although to be fair, Bates later on says that it is ‘an issue of pricing’.

Baroness Altmann:

…as the Equity Release Council figures show, most equity release loans are only about 30% of loan to value—some may be around 50%? Even if house prices were to decline by 30% or more, the problems in the conventional mortgage market would be far greater than those in the equity release market. I was rather surprised to see such scary headlines on this particular segment of the market.

This is the ‘loan to value’ fallacy. If we are modelling the embedded guarantee as a series of European put options, then all such options have a strike price, which will be the compounded loan value at expiry, i.e. the value rolled up without periodic interest payments as with a conventional mortgage. For long periods this strike will be a significant multiple of the original loan to value, and certainly not the 30-50% that Altmann quotes.

Kevin commented on Altmann in an earlier post on August 14. ‘If she has read the report, I see no evidence of it in her comments.’

Fair enough, noble lords.

 

 

Deferment Price Less Than Spot Price? What Else Could It Be?

In a recent posting Guy Thomas takes issue with my new friends at the Prudential Regulation Authority on Consultation Paper CP13/18 which deal with the valuation of the no-negative-equity guarantees (NNEGs) in equity release mortgages. Dean has responded to Guy here, but I would like to stick my own oar in the water too, particularly on the issue of whether the deferment price on a property should be less than the current price.

Continue reading “Deferment Price Less Than Spot Price? What Else Could It Be?”

UnBuffetted

A postbag objector objects to my post on Monday, saying that Warren Buffett explicitly disagrees with quarterly P/L swings on derivative positions, given that they are based on B-S valuations. See e.g. his 2010 newsletter p.21. Given that Buffett is taking in billions of premium without collateral, which he can then invest however he likes, why should this strategy be equivalent to taking a long position, even on no-collateral terms, when the latter would have produced nothing up front?

Continue reading “UnBuffetted”

Reply to Guy

Guy Thomas has an interesting post (‘No-negative-equity guarantees: Black-Scholes and its discontents’, guythomas.org.uk, Thursday 06 September 2018), arguing that the use of the Black-Scholes formula in the context of valuing the no-negative-equity guarantee (NNEG) in equity release mortgages, is flawed in ways that are more fundamental than the PRA blandly suggests.

You can read his article for yourself, but his key points are (1) that the Black-Scholes argument depends crucially on the idea of dynamic hedging and arbitrage, which is not met in the case of housing assets, and ‘is simply not possible in any shape or form’; (2) that Black-Scholes assumes when constructing the dynamic hedge that the underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian motion; (3) that there is no meaningful market in deferment prices [sic] over the periods of 20-40 years most relevant to NNEGs, and furthermore a deferred interest might well be more attractive, particularly if in the form of cash-settled financial contracts, so that all the problems of current interests (nasty tenants, management costs, legal risk etc) are permanently avoided.

Let’s look at these arguments carefully.

Continue reading “Reply to Guy”

Did Buffett get lucky?

We now have a well-stocked cupboard of dodgy option pricing arguments to reply to at some point or another, and it’s not often a new one turns up. Yet that’s what happened the other day. One of our firm-friendly friends told us that Warren Buffett thinks long-dated options are over-priced by Black-Scholes, and that he has proved this claim both by theoretical methods and by practical means, i.e. by making a ton of money. Let’s take a look.

Continue reading “Did Buffett get lucky?”

ONE MORE TIME


Following the publication of Asleep at the Wheel and the launch of this blog Kevin and I have received a steady stream of mail objecting to our claims (and the claims of the PRA) about the valuation of the no negative equity guarantee. There is one idea that dominates, namely that asset growth assumptions should in some way affect the value of a deferment or forward contract, contrary to what we claim. Don’t Kevin and I invest in UK property? Is UK property as a valid asset to hold in a diversified portfolio as an investor? Etc etc.

Now I have already addressed this fallacy in an earlier post. But let’s go through it ‘one more time’, hopefully for the last time.

Continue reading “ONE MORE TIME”

From the postbag

A reader writes questioning my claim in the 7 August BBC interview that Matching Adjustment is fake equity. Compare a gilt and a perpetuity issued by an insurance company, he says. Assume the gilt is highly liquid and can be sold in the secondary market, but the perpetuity is not. Then if the two instruments are priced the same, shouldn’t I choose the gilt every time? And doesn’t this, by implication, suggest that they cannot have the same value?
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What Happens If My Equity Release Provider Goes Bust?

Kevin Dowd 16 August 2018

Adam Williams had an interesting article on this issue in the Daily Telegraph (14 August 2018) .

It’s a good question.

Let me quote from his article and add some comments:

‘What happens if my equity release provider goes bust? (Adam Williams, 14 Aug 2018) … ‘your fears are not unfounded. A report issued by the Adam Smith Institute, a free market pressure group, said the equity release market could be sent into meltdown if house prices were to fall substantially in future’.

Continue reading “What Happens If My Equity Release Provider Goes Bust?”

No comprende

The spate of publicity surrounding ‘Asleep at the Wheel’ unleashed a torrent of nonsense into the printed media and the internet. It will take some time to unravel this, although Kevin has already posted on the subject. See here, on Baroness Altmann’s mistaken idea that he was publishing a risk-model, rather than a valuation model, and here, on the Equity Release Council’s misconception that ‘price trends’ are in any way relevant for pricing or valuing the NNEG.
Continue reading “No comprende”