Wood’s Solvency UK comments welcomed by industry

Insurance ERM this morning on Sam Woods’ comments to the UK Treasury Committee last Monday.

“Dean Buckner, policy director of the UK Shareholders’ Association, welcomed Woods’ admission the new regime would put policyholders at more risk.

He has repeatedly argued how the use of the matching adjustment grants life insurers upfront capital against future investment returns, which may not emerge, and therefore puts firms at risk of running out of capital.

“Our members are increasingly fearful of investment in life insurance companies, given the tendency to decreasing levels of capital, and increasing levels of risk. We thank Sam Woods for speaking out. However, we are disappointed that the government appears to be ignoring these valid concerns,” Buckner said.”

At the same time, the Bank has published the results of its insurance ‘stress test’. Scare quotes, because

In the spread widening stress, the MA increases to offset most of the corresponding fall in asset values within the MA portfolio; and balance sheet deterioration through increased credit risk is not observed until assets start to downgrade. While this result is to be expected under the regime, it does illustrate that the MA does not automatically take account of market signals relating to elevated credit risk at the point where they start to come through

The exam that no firm can fail.

Sam plays it again

From the Treasury Committee hearing, Wednesday 23 June 2021. Steve Baker (SB) questions deputy governor Sam Woods (SW).1

This one will run for a long time, and more later.

SB: Can I just go back to Harriet Baldwin’s question about MA? So I understand correctly, you said it’s about capital set against expected cashflows. But could you just tell me something about the risk profile of those expected cashflows?

SW: Yes, so the way the MA works, crudely, is that if insurance companies can prove to us, to a fairly high – well very high – standard, that they have achieved a fixity of cashflows coming in from the assets, which maps onto what they have got to pay on the other side on the liabilities, we then allow them to use a higher discount rate for their liabilities.

SW: What we do not allow them to take over into that higher discount rate is something called the fundamental spread, because the fundamental spread is meant to capture the risk that those bonds ‘go wrong’. Now there is a lot of work that went into calibrating the fundamental spread when S2 was set up.

SW: The point that I was making was that under the construct that we currently have, there is not an allowance for uncertainty around that going forward, and I think in the context of, if we were looking at broadening elegibility somewhat, if we were looking at de-bureaucratising somewhat, if we were reducing the capital strength and the risk margin, I think in the mix of all that it would make sense to look at that question and I think that there is probably a way of making that work better, which leaves the whole thing square.

SB: So obviously there are, you know, people concerned about MA, some of them experienced in the field of prudential regulation. So the rules that you apply are in public I take it.

SW: Yes

SB: But presumably the application of those rules to individual firms is a matter that is commercially in confidence?

SW: (Pause) Yes, although you know we give you of course the aggregate figures, and the firms themselves I think to various degrees disclose how their capital figures come together and it’s plain, basically, that firms in the annuity business and with heavy credit exposures will be heavy users of the MA.

SB: So I find myself listening to various figures, and they seem to be quite alarmed at the capital position that some firms might be in, because of the MA. What would your advice be to them if they wish to bottom out this argument? What argument would you want to listen to in order to try and bottom this out?

SW: Well I think they should consider the question of, I mean, their argument is essentially – and I am glad that people make that side of the argument because the insurers make the opposite and its good to be attacked on both sides. (laughter) No honestly I think it is a good thing, because I think there should be a debate about this given how important it is. I think the argument I would make to them is, if their contention is basically that you should only ever discount liabilities at the risk free rate, now that is a perfectly respectable world view. That is a world view that in my opinion would have two negative aspects.

SW: One is I do think that that would significantly increase the pricing of annuities, and I don’t know if you have looked around but the annuity you get for £100k is not particularly appetising. But there is just a trade off in there between the degree of risk that we choose to run and the amount of benefit that consumers can get, that’s inevitable. They have a corner solution view on that. So that is one obvious downside of what they suggest.

SW: But the other big downside is that the thing that the MA does which I think is genuinely very helpful and risk reducing is the incentive it provides for them to match. It is actually a very good thing as we go through something like last year with markets going all over the place, [that] insurers can actually ride that out because they have achieved that matching. That is a good thing.

SW: So I think that those are the counterpoints to them, but I think it’s a good thing that they push us around on it.

Written evidence – Quantitative Easing enquiry

Our written evidence for the Economic Affairs Committee has just been published here. What we say will be familiar ground for Eumaeus followers, so I won’t repeat it.

Note that one Rothesay Life publishes its SFCR in May, we will have an updated chart of the ‘real’ versus ‘not so real’ capital coverage ratios. The indication so far is that the gap continues to widen, i.e. more ‘not real’ less ‘real’. At some point the capital created by MA and other machinery may reach the size of the balance sheet itself, which will be the next wonder of the world and a triumph of science.

 

 

 

Definitely a cushion

More to follow but  see below for a partial transcript of the Treasury Committee hearing yesterday, with Harriett Baldwin quizzing Jon Cunliffe and others about the effect of Covid on life insurers.

Does Sir Jon agree with Sir John Vickers “when he says that, er, the Matching Adjustment is more of a  mask than a cushion“?

A lot of waffle from Sir Jon. He says that ‘market liquidity risks’ are not suffered if assets are held to maturity, which is correct, then says “if you were to price the assets that insurance companies hold on their balance sheets at market prices, you would be picking up how liquid the assets were, whether you could sell them in stress etc”,  which is clearly false, but at least confirms that he thinks it is a cushion.

Baldwin complains that she is out of time, and Stride (Chair) closes with the remark that he senses “a slight frustration there, and you might have valued a little more time to probe”

I think on that basis we might write to the panel after this session, and if we do if I can ask the members of the panel to respond very promptly to any letter we might send on the issue of insurance and stress testing.

Clearly more to follow. Stay tuned.

Continue reading “Definitely a cushion”

Liquidity again

Sam Woods was questioned by the Treasury Committee on Wednesday. Transcript below, starting 16:50.

A few odd things. Woods says there have been defaults and downgrades, but soon after claims that ‘blowouts in bond spreads’ are driven by liquidity. He mentions the Matching Adjustment as the ‘piece of machinery that is operating quietly in the background’, and Baldwin asks whether without it there would be actual insolvencies. Woods first says that there wouldn’t, or he thinks there wouldn’t, then says that without it there would be ‘a major problem’.

Why don’t they just state the accounting numbers as they are, i.e. some firms with no net assets at all, or negative assets, adding that this doesn’t make the firms insolvent, because it’s merely a liquidity effect and the spreads will narrow back again? Why falsify the accounting?

More later, I expect.

Continue reading “Liquidity again”

New Treasury Committee

Chair: Mel Stride

Members: Rushanara AliSteve BakerHarriett BaldwinAnthony Browne, Felicity BuchanAngela EagleLiz KendallJulie MarsonAlison McGovernAlison Thewliss

You can see them all on Parliament TV at the first hearing of Wednesday 4 March 2020.

Subject: Appointment of Andrew Bailey as Governor of the Bank of England

Witnesses: Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive, Financial Conduct Authority

Steve Baker gives a particularly firm questioning to the governor-elect.

A very arcane Rule

I just discovered the fabulous Commons TV feature that allows you to link directly to the time you wanted, rather than fumble about with the cursor all night.

So here is Nicky Morgan giving a light grilling, and tbh it’s very light, to David Rule, director of insurance at the PRA.  In which David coins a new verb ‘to dividend’.

My transcript below for those who lack the patience to watch it through.

[EDIT] Full transcript is now here.

Continue reading “A very arcane Rule”

Links

I have updated the links page as follows.

Stress Tests – links mostly to Kevin Dowd’s work on the failures of the Bank’s stress testing regime, which seem to be manifold. There will be more to come as ‘No Stress IV’ approaches publication.

Equity release and the actuarial profession – links forming the source for our work on  Equity Release: A New Equitable in the Making.

Treasury Committee – links to the work of the Treasury Committee’s Solvency II investigation, including its report The Solvency II Directive and its impact on the UK Insurance Industry, October 2017.

 

I would refer you back to the Equitable

Transcript of the Treasury Select Committee hearing, 11 July 2018, on Equity Release, 15:19:50.

Witnesses: Sam Woods, Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority , Sarah Breeden, Executive Director, International Banks Supervision, Bank of England, and David Belsham, External member of the Prudential Regulation Committee.

Continue reading “I would refer you back to the Equitable”