Sam’s Basel Bufferati

Sam Woods’ latest speech “Bufferati” given at City Week on April 26th is a real corker – and its full of dreadful jokes too.

As his colleagues were finishing of their magnus opus Basel III – a hideous monstrosity that should have been killed at birth – Sam wonders out loud about an alternative, which he calls the Bufferati model. Think of capital standards as car models, he suggests. He continues

But I have found myself thinking it might be a good idea to introduce, on the next door assembly line as it were, a new concept car version of the capital stack – radically simpler, radically usable, and a million miles away from the current debate but which might prove instructive over the longer term.

It is refreshing to see a regulator of Sam’s seniority thinking in first principles’ terms. He goes on to say

Design features

While the capital regime is fiendishly complex, its underlying economic goals are fairly simple: ensure that the banking sector has enough capital to absorb losses, preserve financial stability and support the economy through stresses. In developing the Bufferati, my guiding principle has been: any element of the framework that isn’t actually necessary to achieve those underlying goals should be removed. The Bufferati is as simple as possible, but no simpler.

With that mind, my simple framework revolves around a single, releasable buffer of common equity, sitting above a low minimum requirement. This would be radically different from the current regime: no Pillar 2 buffers; no CCoBs, CCyBs, O-SII buffer and G-SiB buffers; no more AT1. [His emphasis]

A little later he adds

“At the core of this concept is a single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks and replacing the entirety of the current set of buffers. [Our emphasis]

And a nice summary

So in summary, the Bufferati has:

  1. A single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks.

  2. A low minimum capital requirement, to maximise the size of the buffer.

  3. A ‘ladder of intervention’ based on judgement for firms who enter their buffer – no mechanical triggers and thresholds.

  4. The entire buffer potentially releasable in a stress.

  5. All requirements met with common equity.

  6. A mix of risk-weighted and leverage-based requirements.

  7. Stress testing at the centre of how we set capital levels.

There is some good stuff in there, but it’s still a bit of a dog’s dinner, leaving a lot of scope for regulatory discretion, gaming of metrics and most worrying of all, the adjective ‘low’ as in ‘low capital requirements’ is a massive red flag.

But in the spirit of Sam’s bufferati/buggerati/whatever model, we would like to suggest some slight improvements as follows, in bold:

So in summary, our improved Bufferati has:

  1. A single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks.

  2. A high minimum capital requirement, with the minimum ratio of capital to leverage exposure or total assets set at (at least) 15%.

  3. No ‘ladder of intervention’; only mechanical triggers and thresholds.

  4. All requirements met with market value common equity.

  5. Only leverage-based requirements.

  6. No stress testing.

So just a couple of tweaks there, Sam, and you’re fine.

An Apology to Our Readers

We have had a long interruption to our postings since our last posting of December 17th. We are very sorry about this, not least because it wasn’t planned. Work simply built up, then Dean went off to Antarctica to hunt photo penquins and play with his sextant perform valuable scientific work and we have been bogged down with research ever since.

Looking ahead, we have some postings to put out shortly, and we have some news on the research front, as various papers come out as working papers or published in journals. More to follow and thank you for bearing with us.

Actuaries and equity release mortgages

The Institute of Actuaries’ “Review Team” has launched an Equity Release Mortgages thematic review, “which will consider the work carried out by actuaries in this area – in particular their role in propositions and pricing activity. The market for equity release mortgages continues to grow, and actuaries have an important role to play in this broad and complex area.”

The review includes a questionnnaire for lenders and a questionnaire for consultants. (Academic researchers apparently are not included).

The questionnaires are focused on the governance of ERM work. Example: “In addition to providing documentation, please describe what examples of documentation are subject to APS and/or TAS assessment (in either valuation/capital functions or propositions/pricing functions) at your organisation.”

Which reminds me, if the TAS (Technical and Actuarial Standards) were any use at all, they would have picked up the massively incorrect valuation method used by most (if not all) firms. This suggests they are not any use at all.

Just saying.

Financial stability implications of IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts

This memorandum from the European Systemic Risk Board highlights discount rates as a key risk in IFRS 17.

IFRS 17 allows two methods (bottom-up and top-down) to calculate discount rates which, in turn, determine the ultimate amount of insurance contract liabilities. In practice, the bottom-up and top-down methods may result in different discount rates. Furthermore, IFRS 17 is going to be applied in an environment of low interest rates, with increased importance of unobservable components (expected and unexpected credit losses, as well as an illiquidity premium). Together with the level of discretion in the requirements of IFRS 17, the behavioural response of insurers may have consequences for financial stability, mainly as a result of large cross-sectoral heterogeneity in the computation of discount rates and ultimately in the valuation of insurance liabilities.

See also:

The significant weight of the unobservable component of discount rates under IFRS 17 may require close attention from audit firms, accounting enforcers and microprudential supervisors. Potential actions could include setting audit expectations, issuing guidelines on how to compute the unexpected components of the top-down and bottom-up methodologies, a benchmarking exercise across European insurers, and setting out expectations on adequate disclosures.

Rip off policyholders to save the planet

Reported in InsuranceERM

On investment in green finance, Evans [Huw Evans, on his last day as director general of the Association of British Insurers] said a useful debate about how the Solvency II Matching Adjustment can be improved has been somewhat overtaken in the UK by a series of Bank of England/PRA interventions. According to Evans, these are seeking to force changes to the fundamental spread element of the Matching Adjustment.

“Not only is this an issue that wasn’t even included by HM Treasury when it set the remit for the review, any changes are almost guaranteed to increase insurer capital levels and make the UK less competitive than insurers based in the EU. And any chance of a significant boost to green investment will almost certainly be lost.”

Loving it!

 

The Crisis to End all Crises

The Financial Times reports:

In a letter to UK bank chief executives, the BoE said its analysis of the circumstances of the Archegos failure had found “significant cross-firm deficiencies” in the way bank prime brokerage businesses allowed the fund to build up huge loans that it ultimately defaulted on.

Interesting. Perhaps our UK Shareholders’ letter had some effect! Or was it Eumaeus, who wrote.

We should also keep in mind that the regulatory models are calibrated to give a 1 in 1,000 years probability of default, so the suspicion arises that the models might not have been calibrated properly. In any case, it would be wise for Bailey and his fellow regulators overseas to look into this issue. Granting a little time to investigate, Bailey then needs to make a statement that he is either confident in the effectiveness of UK regulation in this regard or he is not: the Archegos/Credit Suisse episode is a warning shot across the bow.

?

It now looks as though he is not “confident in the effectiveness of UK regulation in this regard “.  Oh dear. We thought the new and improved system of regulation would make the GFC the “crisis to end all crises”. But I am sure they will sort it all out.

[EDIT] The corresponding Dear CEO letter from Nathanaël Benjamin is here.

A failing, bloated, defensive organisation

 

The All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Personal Banking and Fairer Financial Services (members) has just published some testimonies about the FCA as part of its call for evidence about the FCA.

This testimony from an anonymous FCA employee is particularly striking (though to me, as a previous FSA staffer, not surprising.

Overall, a negative and depressing time in working at the FCA. The FCA has developed a toxic culture and spends huge resources, time and effort on self-protection, of itself, at the expense of supporting consumers. The FCA appears to operate in a malicious and vindictive way and is not willing to accept any kind of constructive criticism from staff. The FCA is a wasting money and staff effort on self-protection which is quite sickening when set against the context of its failures in recent years to regulate firms properly. Based on the evidence I have seen, the FCA is simply not doing its job and has become a failing, bloated, defensive organisation – with most of its efforts and resources going on self-promotion and trying to counter the many criticisms of it.

Quite. The whole unstated purpose of a regulator is to protect itself. When I worked there, you had to suffer all these ridiculous initiatives about ‘learn and change’, ‘vision and values’, ‘making a real difference’ and (at the Bank) ’20 20 vision’, which come across as noble and visionary but really translate to “keep the gravy train running, and don’t get caught for mistakes, even if that means doing nothing much of the time”.

There needs to be strong scrutiny of this absurd organisation, but who has the patience (and the competence) to do it?

On the Profitability of ERM Loans

We are grateful to the editor of the African Journal of Estate and Property Management for publishing our latest article on the profitability (or rather, lack thereof) of ERM loans to lenders. The article is available here:

On the Profitability of Equity Release Mortgage Loans.” (K. Dowd and D. Buckner) African Journal of Estate and Property Management. September 2021.

Continue reading “On the Profitability of ERM Loans”