Just makes no sense

There was an RMS announcement yesterday for the sale of a portfolio of equity release mortgages from Just Group to Rothesay Life. The sale was hinted at in the Interim results released last week.

The announcement is confused partly because the sale is the first of two tranches, with the numbers referring sometimes to the total amount, sometimes to the amount in the first tranche. As far as I can make sense of it, the total imputed value of the loans being transferred is £475m, and the total amount paid by Rothesay is £334m (see also their announcement here), resulting in a theoretical loss of £141m for both tranches. Just Group say that the loss will be only £125m, but they also refer to ‘IFRS value’ as being different from the imputed value.

The stated reason for the loss is “the insurance liabilities impact due to the lower investment yield on the replacement bonds” which does make a kind of sense.

Welcome back to the weird world of Matching Adjustment accounting.

War on cash

Our man Dowd has an article in the Telegraph today.

A cashless society gives the government the power to see your every transaction, and if the government can see your every transaction, then it can control your every transaction.

If it disapproves of what you buy, it can prevent you buying or penalise you. It can use that power for other ends too, at its discretion. If you say the wrong thing online, or disobey an order, it can use that power against you and compel you into compliance. A cashless society is creepy.

Strip away the techno pretence and what you have is an unholy alliance of corporates who want to rip you off and elitists who want to control you.

Not forgetting the restaurants who don’t give the ‘service charge’ to the staff.

Extremely accommodating financial conditions

Source: Nationwide, Dallas Fed

There has been a pile of stuff in the media about the house price boom.  The FT is concerned that “House prices are booming in almost every major economy in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, forging the broadest rally for more than two decades and reviving economists’ concerns over potential threats to financial stability”, and now seems to recognise that it is low interest rates to blame (“Extremely accommodating financial conditions”), although other pundits raise the usual concerns about affordability and the need to carpet green space with housing.

Continue reading “Extremely accommodating financial conditions”

Shareholders’ association slams UK’s IFRS 17 discount rate paper

Interesting article here on the horrible UKEB paper that I mentioned earlier this week. I am quoted extensively.  Behind a paywall, but the main points are

  • the paper conflicts entirely with the points raised in the UKEB’s priorities list, published last week, and fails to reflect concerns raised by Sharon Bowles among others.
  • The paper says that absolute precision (in the ‘measuring’ the illiquidity spread to be used in discount rates) is not necessary, whereas the UKEB’s priority list says that discount rates often have a material impact on accounts.
  • The paper concedes that estimating the illiquidity spread is a matter of judgment, but that is OK because “such judgements and estimates are integral to insurance business and insurers have extensive relevant experience”. The article quotes Hoogervorst (ex chair IASB) highlighting discount rates as one of the inconsistencies IFRS 17 was aiming to correct.

The paper was beyond even the usual joke expected of accounting standards bureaucrats.

 

Dangerous addiction

The Lords report on Quantitative easing is out this morning. Incredibly it is the UK’s first independent comprehensive report into QE.

The report … calls for the BoE to outline a road map that demonstrates how it intends to unwind QE and to engage more openly about the side-effects of the programme, particularly inequality. It suggested that QE artificially inflated asset prices, such as shares and house prices, which had disproportionately benefited those owning them, exacerbating wealth inequalities. “Just ask any youngster trying to buy a flat and they will tell you about the impact of QE,” said Forsyth. (Financial Times)

Generous coverage in the popular press.

Guardian

Independent

Times

Telegraph

More nonsense

I reported earlier on the official list of priorities for the UK Endorsement Board to consider. They have now published the paper that the Board will consider on 20 July next week.

Warning: the paper is truly awful, and was the main reason I stepped down from the Technical Advisory Group in February. Note the inconsistency between the Priority List, which eerily reflects the concerns I raised while on the Group, and the relaxed and unconcerned nature of the paper itself. Left hand meet right hand etc.

Does IFRS 17 require the use of discount rates that are too high?

Well obviously, but interesting that the question is now on the official list of priorities for the UK Endorsement Board to consider.

Their summary is interesting.

  • Some stakeholders have raised concerns that the requirements in IFRS 17 regarding the determination of discount rates will lead to excessive subjectivity (whether in respect of illiquidity premiums or the elimination of market and credit risk). Further, does IFRS 17 require the use of discount rates that are too high because they are in excess of risk-free rates?
  • This is a pervasive aspect of IFRS 17, often with a material impact on the accounts
  • An area of significant entity-level judgement
  • Requirements have attracted controversy and are a primary focus for certain stakeholders
  • Use of rates in excess of risk-free has (indirectly) been referred to in parliamentary debate
  • Users of accounts consider this an area of potential concern due to the subjectivity and the scope for variety in rates applied

My emphasis. I discussed the ‘parliamentary debate’ issue here.

Sam plays it again

From the Treasury Committee hearing, Wednesday 23 June 2021. Steve Baker (SB) questions deputy governor Sam Woods (SW).1

This one will run for a long time, and more later.

SB: Can I just go back to Harriet Baldwin’s question about MA? So I understand correctly, you said it’s about capital set against expected cashflows. But could you just tell me something about the risk profile of those expected cashflows?

SW: Yes, so the way the MA works, crudely, is that if insurance companies can prove to us, to a fairly high – well very high – standard, that they have achieved a fixity of cashflows coming in from the assets, which maps onto what they have got to pay on the other side on the liabilities, we then allow them to use a higher discount rate for their liabilities.

SW: What we do not allow them to take over into that higher discount rate is something called the fundamental spread, because the fundamental spread is meant to capture the risk that those bonds ‘go wrong’. Now there is a lot of work that went into calibrating the fundamental spread when S2 was set up.

SW: The point that I was making was that under the construct that we currently have, there is not an allowance for uncertainty around that going forward, and I think in the context of, if we were looking at broadening elegibility somewhat, if we were looking at de-bureaucratising somewhat, if we were reducing the capital strength and the risk margin, I think in the mix of all that it would make sense to look at that question and I think that there is probably a way of making that work better, which leaves the whole thing square.

SB: So obviously there are, you know, people concerned about MA, some of them experienced in the field of prudential regulation. So the rules that you apply are in public I take it.

SW: Yes

SB: But presumably the application of those rules to individual firms is a matter that is commercially in confidence?

SW: (Pause) Yes, although you know we give you of course the aggregate figures, and the firms themselves I think to various degrees disclose how their capital figures come together and it’s plain, basically, that firms in the annuity business and with heavy credit exposures will be heavy users of the MA.

SB: So I find myself listening to various figures, and they seem to be quite alarmed at the capital position that some firms might be in, because of the MA. What would your advice be to them if they wish to bottom out this argument? What argument would you want to listen to in order to try and bottom this out?

SW: Well I think they should consider the question of, I mean, their argument is essentially – and I am glad that people make that side of the argument because the insurers make the opposite and its good to be attacked on both sides. (laughter) No honestly I think it is a good thing, because I think there should be a debate about this given how important it is. I think the argument I would make to them is, if their contention is basically that you should only ever discount liabilities at the risk free rate, now that is a perfectly respectable world view. That is a world view that in my opinion would have two negative aspects.

SW: One is I do think that that would significantly increase the pricing of annuities, and I don’t know if you have looked around but the annuity you get for £100k is not particularly appetising. But there is just a trade off in there between the degree of risk that we choose to run and the amount of benefit that consumers can get, that’s inevitable. They have a corner solution view on that. So that is one obvious downside of what they suggest.

SW: But the other big downside is that the thing that the MA does which I think is genuinely very helpful and risk reducing is the incentive it provides for them to match. It is actually a very good thing as we go through something like last year with markets going all over the place, [that] insurers can actually ride that out because they have achieved that matching. That is a good thing.

SW: So I think that those are the counterpoints to them, but I think it’s a good thing that they push us around on it.

Impact of Matching Adjustment 2020

Insurance ERM today has a fine table and an accompanying article showing how much life insurance companies are ‘benefiting’ (my scare quotes) from Matching Adjustment.

In summary, the total benefit of MA (created capital plus reduced capital requirement) is now £92bn, up 13% from 2019, and probably reflects the growing business in bulk annuities.

“In 2020, the biggest beneficiary was Legal & General (£28.4bn), followed by Aviva (£14.5bn) and Rothesay Life (£14.1bn)”

The data now allows us to update our own table on the capital coverage ratio ‘benefit’.

Source: Eumaeus, Insurance Risk Data

The blue line shows the capital coverage ratio with MA, the red line, the same ratio but without MA. The usual suspects are still lurking at the right hand side.

Speculating on short term volatility

Retriever writes

But isn’t the point that hedge funds tend to have fairly short time horizons, and that bonds close to redemption will be trading close to par – leading to limited scope for making money in the way you suggest? I’d have thought that what you suggest only works if you can hold the bonds for a long time – so it might work for life insurers even if it doesn’t work for hedge funds?

Continue reading “Speculating on short term volatility”