Sam’s Basel Bufferati

Sam Woods’ latest speech “Bufferati” given at City Week on April 26th is a real corker – and its full of dreadful jokes too.

As his colleagues were finishing of their magnus opus Basel III – a hideous monstrosity that should have been killed at birth – Sam wonders out loud about an alternative, which he calls the Bufferati model. Think of capital standards as car models, he suggests. He continues

But I have found myself thinking it might be a good idea to introduce, on the next door assembly line as it were, a new concept car version of the capital stack – radically simpler, radically usable, and a million miles away from the current debate but which might prove instructive over the longer term.

It is refreshing to see a regulator of Sam’s seniority thinking in first principles’ terms. He goes on to say

Design features

While the capital regime is fiendishly complex, its underlying economic goals are fairly simple: ensure that the banking sector has enough capital to absorb losses, preserve financial stability and support the economy through stresses. In developing the Bufferati, my guiding principle has been: any element of the framework that isn’t actually necessary to achieve those underlying goals should be removed. The Bufferati is as simple as possible, but no simpler.

With that mind, my simple framework revolves around a single, releasable buffer of common equity, sitting above a low minimum requirement. This would be radically different from the current regime: no Pillar 2 buffers; no CCoBs, CCyBs, O-SII buffer and G-SiB buffers; no more AT1. [His emphasis]

A little later he adds

“At the core of this concept is a single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks and replacing the entirety of the current set of buffers. [Our emphasis]

And a nice summary

So in summary, the Bufferati has:

  1. A single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks.

  2. A low minimum capital requirement, to maximise the size of the buffer.

  3. A ‘ladder of intervention’ based on judgement for firms who enter their buffer – no mechanical triggers and thresholds.

  4. The entire buffer potentially releasable in a stress.

  5. All requirements met with common equity.

  6. A mix of risk-weighted and leverage-based requirements.

  7. Stress testing at the centre of how we set capital levels.

There is some good stuff in there, but it’s still a bit of a dog’s dinner, leaving a lot of scope for regulatory discretion, gaming of metrics and most worrying of all, the adjective ‘low’ as in ‘low capital requirements’ is a massive red flag.

But in the spirit of Sam’s bufferati/buggerati/whatever model, we would like to suggest some slight improvements as follows, in bold:

So in summary, our improved Bufferati has:

  1. A single capital buffer, calibrated to reflect both microprudential and macroprudential risks.

  2. A high minimum capital requirement, with the minimum ratio of capital to leverage exposure or total assets set at (at least) 15%.

  3. No ‘ladder of intervention’; only mechanical triggers and thresholds.

  4. All requirements met with market value common equity.

  5. Only leverage-based requirements.

  6. No stress testing.

So just a couple of tweaks there, Sam, and you’re fine.

An Apology to Our Readers

We have had a long interruption to our postings since our last posting of December 17th. We are very sorry about this, not least because it wasn’t planned. Work simply built up, then Dean went off to Antarctica to hunt photo penquins and play with his sextant perform valuable scientific work and we have been bogged down with research ever since.

Looking ahead, we have some postings to put out shortly, and we have some news on the research front, as various papers come out as working papers or published in journals. More to follow and thank you for bearing with us.

On the Profitability of ERM Loans

We are grateful to the editor of the African Journal of Estate and Property Management for publishing our latest article on the profitability (or rather, lack thereof) of ERM loans to lenders. The article is available here:

On the Profitability of Equity Release Mortgage Loans.” (K. Dowd and D. Buckner) African Journal of Estate and Property Management. September 2021.

Continue reading “On the Profitability of ERM Loans”

Float Like a Butterfly

Brexit superhero Steve Baker MP was in fine form on the last (23 June 2021) Treascom meeting. The witness before the Committee was PRA chief executive Sam Woods. Steve began by asking (transcript here, Q69 ff)

‘Q69 Mr Baker: …can I go back to Harriett Baldwin’s question about matching adjustment? If I understood correctly … you said it is about capital being set against expected cash flows. Could you just tell me something about the risk profile of those expected cash flows?

Continue reading “Float Like a Butterfly”

The Hedging Fallacy

In our discussions with equity release actuaries, Dean and I have often come across some recurring arguments.

An example is what we might call the ‘hedging fallacy’ – the argument that we can’t apply B76 (or BS) to value equity release NNEGs because these option price formulas are derived under the assumption that the underlying variable, in this case, forward contracts on residential property, can be hedged. This assumption is obviously empirically invalid, so the argument goes, therefore we shouldn’t use B76/BS. And the argument (often) continues, we should then throw away B76/BS and use the discounted projection approach instead. And thankfully, the discounted projection approach delivers much lower NNEG values. So there is nothing to worry about – all that undervalued NNEG stuff is overhyped.

This argument is false, but it is false in a number of interesting ways.

Continue reading “The Hedging Fallacy”

Could an Archegos Event Happen in the UK?

In the wake of the Archegos fiasco, Malcolm Hurlston and Mark Northway, the chairs of the UK Shareholder Association and Sharesoc respectively, wrote to the Governor of the Bank of England on April 14th to express concerns that this case raises for shareholders. We reproduce the core of their letter:

The situation which has unfolded at Archegos Capital Management recently raises serious concerns not only for private investors, many of whom own bank shares, but for any member of the public with a bank account and particularly those with savings in excess of the FSCS £85,000 threshold. We have learnt that Credit Suisse, one of six banks acting as counterparties to Archegos, may have lost $4.7 billion from the collapse.

Continue reading “Could an Archegos Event Happen in the UK?”

The Market Consistent Approach, Updated

Dean and I have updated our work on the MC approach and have just issued a new Discussion Paper on the subject, ‘A Market Consistent Approach to the Valuation of No Negative Equity Guarantees and Equity Release Mortgages’.

To quote the abstract:

This paper provides a new market consistent approach to the valuation of No Negative Equity Guarantees and Equity Release Mortgages. The paper innovates in two respects. First, it provides a new treatment of net rental yields and deferment rates and a proof that the two are equal. Second, the paper provides a new approach to the estimation of the volatility inputs. The proposed approach to volatility produces a volatility term structure that is dependent on the age and gender of the borrower. Illustrative valuations are provided based on the Black ’76 put pricing formula and mortality projections based on the M5 Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) mortality model. Results have interesting ramifications for industry practice and prudential regulation.

The word ‘interesting’ does a lot of the heavy lifting here.

We will be presenting the paper to David Blake’s Sixteenth International Longevity Risk and Capital Markets Solutions conference in Copenhagen in August.